Bond mutual funds engagement in liquidity transformation and their rapid growth over the past several years have created concerns about the threats they pose to corporate bond market stability. In this paper, I study the impact of fund redemptions and resulting sell-offs on corporate bond yields. To control for unobserved changes in fundamentals, I study within-issuer variation of yield changes, resulting from differential exposure to redemptions and sell-offs. In contrast to previous findings for equity funds, I find no evidence indicating that bond funds destabilize the corporate bond market by moving prices beyond fundamental values. I attribute this finding to bond fund management. Although I find that investors demonstrate a bank-run like behavior, which is a potential source of destabilization, bond fund managers hold a significant level of liquid assets, allowing them to manage redemptions without excessively liquidating corporate bonds.
redemptions and the corporate bond market was very illiquid, the impact of sell-offs on bond yields is shown to be short-lived, small in magnitude and limited to the subsample of distressed funds.
{Insert Figure 1} To identify the impact of redemptions and the resulting sell-offs on bond yields, simultaneous changes in bond fundamentals need to be controlled for. Changes in bond fundamentals are usually unobserved and failing to properly control for them creates two types of endogeneity issues. First, redemptions from a fund are correlated to the performance of its holdings.
Therefore, bonds that experience a negative shock to their fundamental values and perform poorly are more exposed to investor redemptions. Second, when facing redemptions, fund managers may choose to sell bonds with a negative (less positive) outlook. As a result, bonds that are sold off usually have weaker fundamentals than other bonds. The first issue creates omitted variable or reverse causality and the second issue creates selection bias in identifying the impact of redemptions and the resulting sell-offs on bond yields. In other words, an
1 The "Asset Management and Financial Stability" report by the US Treasury's Office of Financial Research is another example showing regulators concern about this issue. This report, released in September 2013, intended to help regulators better understand asset management industry and its activities to be able to decide about weather -and how -such firms should be considered for enhanced prudential standards and supervision under the section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
observed decline in price (increase in yield) may be erroneously attributed to redemptions and the resulting sell-offs while it is just due to changes in the fundamental value.
While different methods have been used in the literature, I use a distinct feature of corporate bonds to address these issues. In this paper, by examining issuers with multiple bond offerings, I am able to control for the unobserved changes in fundamentals and tease out the impact of redemptions and resulting sell-offs on bond yields. In particular, I analyze within-issuer variation of yield changes, caused by differential exposure to fund redemptions and resulting sell-offs. I implement this strategy by including issuer-time fixed effects in my regressions.
Interestingly, when issuer-time FEs are excluded which makes the identification subject to endogeneity issues, the results completely change and show a positive and significant impact of redemptions and resulting sell-offs on bond yields. This hence, shows that not addressing endogeneity issues properly distorts the results and leads to a misleading conclusion.
My finding that bond funds do not move bond yields beyond fundamental values is somewhat puzzling because the literature has found the opposite for equity funds. Given that the corporate bond market is less liquid than the stock market, the adverse impacts of bond funds are expected to be even higher than those of the equity funds. Trying to explain my finding, I study the redemption behavior of bond fund investors as well as fund management techniques in response to those redemptions. Finally to better understand the differences between bond funds and equity funds, I compare their redemption management practices.
Corporate bond funds engage in liquidity and maturity transformation, that is, they finance their long-term illiquid assets with short-term liquid liabilities. According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , this creates first-mover advantage and makes bond funds subject to investor runs. Using correlated flows as a measure for runs, I find that bond fund investors exhibit a bank-run like behavior. As expected, this behavior is more pronounced for funds whose holdings are less liquid and when the overall market liquidity is low. My results are consistent with Chen, Goldestein and Jiang (2010) who document runs on equity funds as a source of destabilization.
Establishing the potential for runs on bond funds not only cannot explain why bond funds do not destabilize the corporate bond market, but also makes it even more puzzling. Therefore looking for an explanation for my finding, I next investigate redemption management practices of bond fund managers. First, I show that the portfolio composition of corporate bond funds looks different than those of equity funds. In contrast to equity funds, bond funds hold a significant amount of liquid assets, such as cash and government securities. Second, I show that when facing redemptions, bond fund managers sell cash and government securities first rather than transacting in the corporate bond market. Even when transacting in the corporate bond market, bond managers sell the most liquid corporate bonds to minimize the price impact.
Therefore, my results show that bond fund managers tend not to transmit redemptions to the corporate bond market.
Finally, trying to justify my results compared to previous findings for equity funds, I compare bond funds and equity funds in their redemption management practices. Given similar redemption levels, I show that equity funds sell stocks in a much larger magnitude than bond funds sell corporate bonds. These massive equity sell-offs may lead to significant price movements. Conversely, bond funds holding adequate buffer, do not have to excessively liquidate corporate bonds to meet redemption requests and hence, do not destabilize corporate bond prices. This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, there is a vast and still growing literature studying stock price movements induced by mutual funds and other institutions, including Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Gibson, Safieddine and Titman (2000) , Edelen and Warner (2001) , Stein (2005) , Coval and Stafford (2007) , Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai (2007) , Chen, Hanson, Hong and Stein (2008) , Zhang (2009) , Shleifer and Vishny (2010) , Ben-Rephael, Kandel and Wohl (2011) , Greenwood and Thesmar (2011), Lou (2012) , Merrill, Nadauld, Stulz and Sherlund (2012) , Hau and Lai (2013) . Additionally, Ambrose, Cai and Helwege (2008) and Ellul, Jotikasthira and Lundblad (2011) look at price pressure on corporate bonds caused by insurance companies sell-offs. This paper fills the gap by studying the impact of bond mutual funds on corporate bond prices.
The second strand of literature this paper contributes to studies investor runs on financial institutions. This literature begins with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on bank runs and expands to other markets and institutions such as equity funds, Chen, Goldestein and Jiang (2010) , repo market, Gorton and Metrick (2012) , money market funds, Schmidt, Timmermann, and Wermers (2014) and asset-backed commercial paper market, Schroth, Suare and Taylor (2014) .
Finally, this paper is related to the theoretical and empirical literature studying the behavior of fund managers facing flows, including Vayanos (2004) , Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007) , Lou (2012) , Manconi, Massa and Yasuda, (2012) , Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) .
Data
My empirical analysis focuses on 4,647 corporate bond funds between 2004-Q1 and 2014-Q2. I define a corporate bond fund as a fund that on average invests more than 20% of its net asset value in corporate bonds throughout the sample period. Usually there is more than one fund (share class) for each portfolio; therefore in total I have 1,238 distinct portfolios in my sample.
All my analysis occurs at the portfolio level because my main focus is on fund holdings and trades, which are the same for different share classes within a portfolio. Different share classes within a portfolio, however, usually have different returns, management fees, expenses, etc. To calculate these variables at the portfolio level, I take the net asset value-weighted average of share classes within a portfolio.
My data comes from a variety of sources. I use the CRSP Mutual Fund database to get the data on monthly fund returns and total net assets. Monthly and quarterly fund flows are then calculated using these two data points for each fund. Fund characteristics such as expense ratios and portfolio turn-over also come from CRSP. I use Morningstar to get quarterly portfolio related data such as asset class weights, average credit rating and average maturity of each portfolio. For quarterly bond mutual fund holdings, I combine the CRSP Mutual Fund database and Morningstar.
2 I use Thomson Reuters to get quarterly equity mutual fund holdings. I use the TRACE to get bond transaction data such as price, yield and trading volume. Finally I use Mergent FISD to get corporate bond characteristics. Table 1 presents variable definitions and summary statistics.
{Insert Table 1} 2 CRSP Mutual Fund database is not complete for bond funds especially before 2008.
Corporate bond market destabilization
According to Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , destabilization means prices move away from fundamental values which leads to an increase in long-run price volatility. While the impact of equity mutual funds on stock prices has been largely studied in the literature, there is almost no study on bond mutual funds and their impact on corporate bond prices (yields).
In this paper I try to fill this gap by studying the impact of redemptions from bond funds and the resulting sell-offs on bond yields. Needless to say, I am interested in changes in bond yields as far as they are induced by bond funds, not by changes in the fundamental values.
Mutual funds engage in liquidity transformation, that is, providing daily liquidity to investors while investing in less liquid assets. This liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities may lead to price pressure when mutual funds have to sell assets in large amounts to meet investor redemptions. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2010) , these redemption-induced or sell-offs may turn into fire sales because the potential buyers of an asset cannot buy it due to financial constraints.
3 Therefore, these assets have to be sold to an investor with less expertise with that asset, hence willing to pay a lower price for it. In this paper I study the impact of redemption from bond mutual funds, and the resulting sell-offs on changes in corporate bond yields. Identifying these impacts is a challenging task because they usually confound with the fundamental changes of corporate bonds. Therefore, if we observe a change in bond yields, we cannot distinguish if this change is due to fund redemptions and sell-offs or due to changes in the fundamental value of the bond.
Thinking of this problem in a regression framework, exposure to funds redemptions or the exposure to resulting sell-offs is the independent variable of interest, while the change in the bond yield is the dependent variable. To identify the impact of the independent variable of interest, I have to control for other variables that are correlated with it and has an impact on the dependent variable. One variable that I need to control for is the changes in the fundamental values. Changes in the fundamental value clearly have an impact on bond yields, and meanwhile are correlated with redemptions and the resulting sell-offs because of two reasons. First, redemptions from bond funds are not usually exogenous to the fund holdings fundamentals. Funds whose holdings have weak fundamentals experience larger redemptions.
Second, trying to meet redemptions, fund managers may choose to sell bonds with declining fundamental values. Therefore, to properly identify the impact of redemptions and resulting sell-offs on bond yields, I have to control for changes in the fundamental values.
Different methods have been used in the literature to address these issues. For example, Coval and Stafford (2007) and Ellul et al. (2011) use resulting price reversals as evidence that price changes are not due to changes in fundamental values. Hau and Lai (2013) use the exposure of equity mutual funds to the financial stocks prior to the recent financial crisis as an exogenous shock to the mutual fund flows during the crisis. Ambrose et al. (2008) use a simultaneous changes in the stock price as an indication of a change in the firm fundamentals studying the price pressure on corporate bonds. 4 The problem with these methods is that the impact of fundamentals is not completely controlled for. For example, Coval and Stafford (2007) show that the stocks that are sold as a result of fund flows are fundamentally different from an average stock held by mutual funds.
An ideal setting to identify the effect of redemption from funds on market destabilization is to have multiple assets with the same fundamentals but different exposures to redemptions and sell-offs. The corporate bond market provides this setting. Many firms have more than one outstanding corporate bond. Different bonds of the same firm are exposed to the same fundamental risks but might be held by different funds, hence exposed differentially to redemptions and sell-offs. I exploit this feature by using firm-time fixed effects in my identification. As a result, any differential changes in the yields of bonds, issued by the same firm, can be attributed to the differential exposures to redemptions and sell-offs.
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My empirical setting is as follows. In each quarter, I pick the funds in the bottom quartile of flows. These funds experience the largest redemption and hence, may be forced to sell some of their corporate bond holdings. I call these funds "distressed bond funds" throughout the paper.
I am interested in studying the impact of two different measures on changes in bond yields.
The first measure, exposure to redemptions, is based on the ex-ante potential sales of corporate bonds. In this measure, which is defined for each bond issue in each quarter, I aggregate the holdings of all distressed funds in the beginning of each quarter. Then I normalize it by the outstanding amount of each bond issue. The logic behind this measure is that if a large fraction of a corporate bond issue is held by funds that experience large outflows over the next quarter, that bond potentially experiences a higher pressure on its yield.
Holding if (t−1) , f ∈ {f unds in the lowest f low quartile at t}
In defining the second measure, exposure to sell-offs, I follow Coval and Stafford (2007) . This measure is based on actual sales by bond funds. In this measure which is defined for each bond issue in each quarter, I aggregate corporate bond sales by all distressed funds over the current quarter. Then I normalize it by the outstanding amount of each bond issue. I call this measure exposure to sell-offs because these sales are executed by distressed funds, it is very likely that fund managers are forced to sell these bonds to meet the redemptions. Therefore if a large fraction of a corporate bond issue is subject to sell-offs, that bond potentially experiences a higher pressure on its yield.
Sell if t , f ∈ {f unds in the lowest f low quartile at t}
There is a main difference between the first and the second measure. A corporate bond may be held by distressed funds, but not necessarily being sold, because the fund manager prefers to sell more liquid assets to meet the redemptions. Therefore, I expect that the second measure, exposure to sell-offs, will have a larger impact on yields, if there are any.
As Shleifer and Vishny (2010) state, fire sale happens when the potential buyers of an asset cannot buy it because they are constrained. So the asset has to be sold to an investor with less expertise with that asset, hence willing to pay a lower price for it. The recent financial crisis (2008) (2009) ) is a good example of when sell-offs could turn into fire sales, because the potential buyers of corporate bonds such as banks, hedge funds and bond mutual funds were financially constrained and could not provide enough liquidity to the corporate bond market. Therefore, I also investigate whether the impact of redemptions and the resulting sell-offs on bond yields are higher during the crisis.
I run the following regressions to see if redemptions from bond funds and the resulting sell-offs have a significant impact on bond yields. Moreover I let these impacts be different during the crisis. I exclude all corporate bonds that are in a foreign currency or convertible because their yields may change due to other reasons such as changes in stock prices and exchange rates.
On the left hand side, the dependent variable is the change in the yield spread of bond i for firm j over the quarter t. Amihud illiquidity and its interaction with the crisis dummy.
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Finally I add firm-quarter fixed effect, µ jt , to absorb any changes in the fundamentals of a firm over the quarter. These FEs help me to capture the yield spread changes which are solely due to differential exposure to sell-offs by distressed funds. I also run the regressions excluding the firm-quarter FEs to see if my results change. Excluding firm-quarter FEs make my identification subject to endogeneity. It means that the impact of changes in the fundamental value of a bond might be confounded with the impacts of redemptions and sell-offs. Therefore, I expect to see a larger impact of the coefficients of interest, when firm-quarter fixed effects are excluded from the regressions. The left panel of Table 2 presents the results using the preferred identification, including the firm-quarter FEs. The right panel of Table 2 presents the results of the same regressions as in the left panel but excluding firm-quarter FEs.
6 If I exclude all bonds that are callable, puttable and sinking fund, I lose a lot of observations. However, even excluding them results are qualitatively similar.
7 Different bond issues of the same firm may also be different in the security level. Since more than 60% of the corporate bond in my sample are senior debt, I run regressions (3) and (4) only for senior bonds as a robustness check and the results still hold.
{Insert Table 2} In the left panel, as we can see in columns (1) to (4), using both measures and in both specifications the impact of redemptions and sell-offs on bond yield spreads are not significant during normal times. However, increasing exposure to sell-offs by one standard deviation during the crisis increases the yield spread of the bond by 18.5 bps (column 1). This figure is 9.2 bps in the second specification (column 2) when I control for the bond illiquidity. The lower impact when I control for liquidity is expected, because the yield change is partially just due to illiquidity.
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In the right panel, as we can see in columns (5) to (8), the impact of redemptions and sell-offs are significant, even during the normal times.
9 Since excluding firm-quarter fixed effects make the identification subject to endogeneity, I argue that the results are misleadingly overstated. Using the preferred identification (the left panel), the impact of sell-offs on bond yields is statistically significant during the crisis, while economically very small. During the crisis, the average corporate bond yield spread is 670 bps. Therefore, 9.2 pbs is less than 1.5% increase in yield spread as a result of one standard deviation increase in exposure to sell-offs. In addition, I want to investigate this impact even further. Hence, I try to answer three questions: 1) Is this impact only limited to the crisis time? 2) Is this impact limited to distressed funds? 3) Does this impact last for more than a quarter? In order to answer these questions, I run four tests, each of them in specification corresponding to the Table 2 columns (1) and (2).
In the first test, I run the same regression, equation (4), for funds in the second lowest flow quartile. Since redemptions from those funds are not as high as distressed funds, I expect fund 8 I also run the regression (4) for bonds issued by financial firms and bonds issued by non-financial firms, separately. The results (not reported) show that the sell-offs' impact during the crisis is not only limited to financial firms. Bonds issued by financial firms are identified by their industry group equal to 2 in the Mergent FISD database.
9 Note that during the studying period between January 2004 and June 2014, excluding the crisis Q1-2008 to Q2-2009, the average yield spread is 210 bps. Therefore 12.51 bps (Table 2, column 8 second row) is almost 6% increase in yield spread as a result of one standard deviation increase in exposure to redemptions. This 6% increase is both economically and statistically significant. managers to be able to manage redemptions by selling more liquid assets such as cash and government bonds. Therefore, they do not have to engage in a lot of corporate bonds sales, hence we should not find a significant yield change of the bonds they sell. Table 3 columns (1) and (2) confirm that sales by non-distressed funds have no significant impact on bond yields, even during the crisis.
In the second and third tests, I move the crisis 6 quarters backward and 6 quarters forward, respectively. Table 3 columns (3) to (6) show the results which confirm that the impact of sell-offs on bond yields is only limited to the crisis. These findings are consistent with the definition of fire sale by Shleifer and Vishny (2010) . Right before the crisis and right after the crisis we do not see significant yield changes as a result of sell-offs because potential buyers of corporate bonds were not constrained and could provide enough liquidity to the market.
Finally in the last test, I measure the change in the yield spread from the beginning of the quarter where the sell-offs happen and the end of the next quarter. The purpose of this test is to see if the impact of sell-offs during the crisis lasts beyond one quarter. As the results in Table 3 columns (7) and (8) show, the yield pressure is short-lived and does not last beyond one quarter. In summary, Table 3 shows that the impact of sell-offs on bond yields is short-lived, limited to distressed funds and limited to the financial crisis.
{Insert Table 3} The previous literature has shown that equity funds have destabilizing impacts on the stock market. Given the illiquidity of the corporate bond market, the adverse impact of bond funds on corporate bonds are expected to be high. However, my findings so far show that bond funds do not have a significant destabilizing impact on the corporate bond market. In the rest of the paper I will try to investigate why my results are contrary to expectations. In order to do that, first I study the behavior of bond fund investors in redeeming shares to see whether they show a destabilizing behavior. Then I examine the behavior of fund managers in response to investor redemptions. Finally, I lay out a comparison between bond funds and equity funds in the way they manage flows to explain the contrasting findings for equity and bond funds.
4 Do investors run to exit from bond funds?
Institutional background
Runs on financial institutions as a source of destabilization and fragility are mostly studied in the context of banking. In principal however, runs can happen to any financial institution or even a firm where there is a liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities (liabilities are more liquid than assets), according to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . For example, Chen, Goldestein and Jiang (2010) document a run-like behavior by equity mutual fund investors.
They also show that this behavior is stronger for illiquid funds. Similarly during the recent financial crisis, this run-like behavior happened to financial institutions such as exchange-traded funds, asset-backed SIVs and money market funds (Schmidt et al. (2013) ). In this section, I
investigate whether open-end bond mutual funds are subject to investor runs.
In general, when an investor anticipates an adverse effect on her own future return if other investors withdraw their money from an institution, her optimal response is to pull her money right away regardless of the fundamentals. This is also known as the "first-mover advantage" in the literature. This happens because open-end mutual fund structure gives the investors the right to redeem their shares for cash based on the end of the day net asset value (NAV).
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Unlike money market funds where price is bound to a threshold, mutual funds' NAV reflects the value of the underlying portfolio at each point in time. Moreover, there is no implicit or explicit guarantee by the investment management company that NAV stays above for instance a threshold. Therefore, theoretically a mutual fund investor should not care about the activities of other investors and as a result, there should not be a first-mover advantage.
However, first-mover advantage and consequently run on mutual funds, exist in reality. The reason behind the first-mover advantage is that there are some costs borne by the remaining investors when an investor redeems her shares and leaves the fund. When an investor redeems her shares, she is being paid based on the NAV calculated at the end of that trading day, while portfolio re-balancing usually happens the next day. So all the costs associated with portfolio rebalancing will be reflected in the future NAV and are borne only by remaining investors. These costs include commissions, bid-ask spreads, fire sale or even indirect costs such as deviating from the optimal portfolio (Edelen (1999) , Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) , Alexander et al. (2007) , Coval and Stafford (2007) , Bu and Lacey (2013) ). Chen et al. (2010) claim these costs are not negligible and can result in payoff complementarities among investors.
Fund managers are aware of these costs and try to mitigate the adverse effect of redemptions to remaining investors. In order to do that they take various measures such as holding cash, charging redemption fees, limiting the number of times an investor can enter and exit a fund and suspending redemptions or delivering redemption in kind in the case of emergency. Chen et al. (2010) argue that even though these measures are undertaken by many funds, they cannot completely prevent investors from running on a mutual fund especially when the underlying portfolio is illiquid.
Hypotheses Development
In this section I investigate whether investors run to exit from bond mutual funds. I identify investors run by measuring flow correlation (the sensitivity of the current flow to past flow).
If the current flow is positively correlated with the past flow, I argue that current flow follows the past flow. In other words, investors' decision to move their money in or out of a fund is influenced by what other investors did in the previous period.
11 Schmidt et al. (2013) use a similar measure to identify runs on money market funds.
As discussed before, the costs associated with portfolio rebalancing create first-mover advantage.
When these costs are higher, the first-mover advantage is larger, so is the incentive for run among investors. The portfolio rebalancing costs such as commissions, bid-ask spreads and price impact are higher when the liquidity of the funds holdings are low. Therefore, there should be a stronger incentive among investors to run on illiquid funds and at the time of low overall market illiquidity. Using these variations in liquidity, I develop the following hypotheses:
H(I). Flow correlation increases when the liquidity of the bond market drops. Moreover, this increase is asymmetrically larger for negative flows.
H(II). Flow correlation is higher (lower) for less (more) liquid funds.
H(III). During the time of low overall market liquidity, flow correlation increases as the fund liquidity decreases. Moreover, this increase is asymmetrically larger for negative flows. as the negative news about subprime mortgages became public. 12 Consequently, their trades collapsed because investors were not sure about the quality of their collateral. This opacity made these assets information-sensitive and hence illiquid whereas they were previously very liquid.
Empirical Evidence
{Insert Figure 2} Therefore as discussed, at the very least the liquidity of corporate and non-agency backed securitized bonds, which make more than 65% of bond mutual funds' holdings, dropped significantly during the crisis. Therefore, I claim that during the crisis the overall liquidity of bond funds' holdings dropped.
{Insert Figure 3} I run the following regressions to test H(I). According to H(I), β 2 must be positive and significant. I also run the regressions on the subsample of negative flows. H(I) states that β 2 /β 1 should be greater for the subsample of negative flows.
In the first regression, I use Amihud as a proxy for market illiquidity. where the liquidity of the bond market dropped significantly. This helps me to focus on the run-like behavior of investors during the financial crisis.
In both regressions, I also control for flows of lag 2 and lag 3, past performance, interaction between past performance and Amihud/crisis, log of total net assets and fund expense ratio.
Note that I include fund fixed effects and time fixed effects to absorb any time invariant fund specific factors and any fund invariant time specific factors, respectively. For the ease of interpretation, I normalize the Amihud variable by subtracting the mean from each value and dividing by the standard deviation. Therefore, the corresponding coefficients are the change in the dependent variable for one standard deviation change in Amihud illiquidity measure. Table 4 , Panels A and B, columns (1) and (3) present the results. The results confirm H(I) and indicate that investors' decision to redeem their shares in the current period is more affected by the other investors' decision, when the market is less liquid and also during the crisis.
Moreover, as we can see in Table 4 , Panel A, for one standard deviation increase in market illiquidity, flow correlation increases by 30% for the subsample of negative flows whereas this figure is only 25% for the full sample. These two figures for Panel B, are 103% and 47%
respectively. This asymmetrical behavior for negative flows confirms the second part of H(I).
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{Insert Table 4} In H(II), I test the effect of fund liquidity, in the cross section, on flow correlation. H (II) states that when the liquidity of fund holdings is low, investors are more concerned about the adverse effects of departing investors; hence investors show a stronger run-like behavior. H(III) combines the implications of H(I) and H(II) in the time series and the in cross-section. It states that during the overall market illiquidity, the flow correlation should be even higher for funds whose holdings are less liquid.
In the cross-section, funds vary in terms of the liquidity of their holdings. Due to data limitations, I cannot precisely measure the liquidity of each fund's holdings. 14 Therefore, I use the volatility of the past fund flows as a proxy for the overall liquidity of a fund, as in Manconi et al. (2012) . 15 If a fund's flow volatility is high, it must hold more liquid assets, otherwise the transaction costs and bid-ask spreads that the fund has to pay each time it re-balances its portfolio would be huge. So higher flow volatility translates into higher fund liquidity. I calculate flow volatility for each fund as the standard deviation of flows over the past 12 months.
To test H(II) and H(III), I run the following regressions where the coefficients of interest in these regressions are β 3 and β 4 . I run these regressions on both the full sample and the subsample of negative flows.
In these regressions, I also control for flows of lag 2 and lag 3, past performance, interaction between past performance and Amihud/crisis, log of total net assets and fund expense ratio.
Note that I include fund fixed effects and time fixed effects to absorb any time invariant fund specific factors and any fund invariant time specific factors, respectively. To make interpreting the results easier, I normalize the flow volatility by subtracting the mean from each value and dividing by the standard deviation. Therefore the corresponding coefficients are the change in the dependent variable for one standard deviation change in flow volatility. Table 4 , Panels A and B, columns (2) and (4) present the results of regressions (7) and (8) respectively. As H(II) predicts, for more liquid funds, flow correlation is lower, β 3 is negative and significant. This confirms that for more liquid funds, investors are less concerned about the adverse effects of departing investors, hence they have less incentive to run.
The results in Table 4 , Panels A and B support the predictions of H(III) as well. As we can see in in columns (2) and (4), the increase in flow correlation for illiquid funds is exacerbated when the market illiquidity increases and also during the crisis. In both cases β 4 is negative and significant. This means that when the market is illiquid, the incentive to run is incrementally higher for illiquid funds. We can also observe an asymmetry in this incremental impact. For instance, looking at column (4) Panel B, we can see that during the crisis, one standard deviation decrease in flow volatility, increases the flow correlation by 24.2% for the subsample of negative flows; this figure is 17.2% for the full sample.
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5 How do fund managers manage redemptions?
Asset allocation
Unlike equity funds that mainly invest either in cash or in equities, bond funds invest in asset classes with different risk-return and liquidity characteristics. Therefore, bond funds may have a flexibility to reallocate assets more effectively to manage redemptions. For instance Manconi et al. (2012) show that in the beginning of the crisis securitized bonds became toxic and hence less liquid. As a result, bond funds facing redemptions tended to sell more corporate bonds which were more liquid than securitized bonds.
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{Insert Figure 2} In this section I study how bond fund managers reallocate assets between asset classes to manage flows, in particular, redemptions. I focus on the four major asset classes: cash and cash equivalents, government securities, corporate bonds and securitized bonds. 18 On one hand, cash and government securities provide a low return but almost no default risk. They can also be used as a cushion against redemptions because they are highly liquid. On the other hand, corporate and securitized bonds deliver a higher return and also higher risk.
19 These assets are less liquid and might be subject to high bid-ask spreads and high transaction costs.
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Fund managers may follow three strategies in the asset (re)allocation level to meet redemptions.
The first strategy is to liquidate the most liquid asset classes first. This strategy has the least adverse effect on the funds performance since these assets usually generate less return. In addition, due to their high liquidity they can be sold on a short notice with the least price impact. However, this strategy leads to a lower fund liquidity since the fund is left mostly with illiquid assets. As discussed in Section 4, this might lead to more redemptions which is not desirable for fund managers. The second strategy is to keep the more liquid asset and sell less liquid assets. This hurts the fund performance due to the high price impact of selling illiquid assets. However, if the fund manager believes that redemptions will continue, this strategy might be optimal, (Vayanos (2004) ). And finally the third strategy is just being passive and selling all assets proportionally.
These three strategies have different implications on the stability of the corporate bond market. For instance, by following the first strategy, fund managers mitigate the impact of redemption shocks on the corporate bond market. In the second strategy, by contrast, redemption shocks are amplified and transmitted to the corporate bond market. The third strategy is neutral and transmit redemptions to the corporate bond market without affecting their magnitude.
In the empirical setting, my goal is to explain how asset class weights change in response to fund flows, controlling for other important factors. I begin with the identity equation which relates the weight of asset class j in fund i in two consecutive time periods. Note that j takes four values: cash and cash equivalents, government securities, securitized bonds and corporate
18 They also invest in municipal bonds and derivatives but the magnitudes are negligible. Appendix 2 has the detailed constituents of each asset class.
19 Agency mortgage-backed securities that are a part of securitized bonds are perceived safe because they used to have implicit government guarantee before the crisis. This guarantee became explicit during the crisis.
20 Begalle et al. (2013) estimate of liquidity of different asset classes under normal market conditions and provide a consistent liquidity ranking.
bonds.
In equation (9), W ijt is the weight of asset class j in fund i at time t, return ijt is the gross return of asset class j in fund i at time t, f low ijt is the flow to the asset class j in fund i at time t defined as the dollar amount of flow divided by the net assets invested in that asset class at the end of the previous period. Return it is the total gross return of fund i at time t and f low it is the total flow to fund i at time t defined as the dollar amount of flow divided by the total net assets at the end of the previous period. As we can see, the current weight of each asset class depends on its weight on the previous period, the return of that asset class, the flow to that asset class, total fund return and total fund flow, all of them at time t. Note in equation (9), the flow to each asset class is determined by the fund manager and all other factors are exogenous.
In equation (9), the variable W , does not have a linear relationship with other factors. So I use log-linearization around the steady state to make it linear. I define the steady state as when flows both to the fund and to each asset class are equal to zero and gross returns are equal to one, i.e., no weight change. After log-linearizing equation (9), I will have the following equation in which ω is the natural logarithm of weights and ε is the second order approximation error.
The change in the log weight of each asset class in the first order approximation, is the sum of the relative return and the relative flow. For instance, if a fund manager is passive in reallocating capital over different asset classes, (f low ijt − f low it ) = 0, then the log weight of that asset class changes by its return relative to the total fund return. As I mentioned earlier, fund managers have discretion only over the flow to each asset class (reallocating capital over asset classes) and all other factors in equation (10) are determined either by the market or the investors. 21 I hypothesize the flow to each asset class can be determined by the following factors: lagged log-weight of the asset class, relative performance of the asset class in the current period, total flow to the fund, the sign of the fund flow and the interaction between the fund flow and its sign.
I include the lagged weight because each fund may have an optimal long term target weight for each asset class. Therefore, the lagged weight might be an important determinant of how much capital the fund manager wants to allocate to the asset class to bring it back to its optimal level. Performance of each asset class relative to the total performance of the fund is included as well because if an asset class is doing well (poorly) relative to other asset classes, the fund manager may decide to allocate more (less) capital to the asset class. Fund flow sign is a dummy which is equal to one when flow is negative and zero otherwise. I include flow sign because the reaction of fund managers might not be symmetric facing inflows and outflows.
Later in the empirical results I show that this is actually the case. Moreover, I include the interaction between flow and its sign to capture the difference in the slop of the flow depending on its sign.
In equation (10), I substitute f ijt with its equivalent in equation (11) and I come up with the following equation which is linear in asset class weights.
In equation (12), β 1 = 1 + γ 1 , β 2 = 1 + γ 2 , β 3 = γ 3 − 1 and ijt = ε ijt + ν ijt . I add quarter fixed effects to absorb any unobservable time specific factor that affects asset class weights. I also include fund fixed effects to absorb any time invariant fund specific factor that may have an effect on asset class weights. Now I can run this regression for each asset class to see how their weights change in response to flows. As shown in Figure 2 , the main asset classes that corporate bond mutual funds invest in are cash and cash equivalents, government securities, securitized bonds and corporate bonds.
In each regression corresponding to an asset class, I have a panel with fund fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable, (ω ij(t−1) ), as an explanatory variable. Nickell (1981) shows that in this setting lagged dependent variable and the errors are correlated. Therefore OLS produces inconsistent coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. The inconsistency is in the order of 1/T so for small Ts the inconsistency is large. If other independent variables are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, their coefficients might be biased too. Thus I use the method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for estimating dynamic panel data. As Roodman (2006) states, this method is complicated and many parameters need to be set so it can easily generates invalid estimates. Thus, I also report the results from the OLS regression just to make sure that my estimates are not totally off the chart.
Results are reported in Table 5 . The coefficient of flow is positive and significant for cash and government securities. This indicates the weights of these two asset classes move in the same direction as fund flows. In other words, when fund managers face redemptions (inflow), they decrease (increase) the weight of cash and government securities in their portfolio. Conversely, the coefficients of flow are negative and significant for securitized bonds and corporate bonds.
This means that when funds face redemptions (inflows), the weight of the corporate and securitized bonds go up (down). Note that this does not mean that bond funds buy corporate bonds when they face redemptions. It means corporate bonds might get sold but relatively less than other asset classes, hence, their weight in the portfolio goes up.
{Insert Table 5} The coefficient of the flow sign is also negative and significant for cash and government bonds and positive and significant for corporate bonds and securitized bonds. Note that flow sign dummy is equal to one for negative flows. The results show that when there is a redemption, regardless of its magnitude, the weight of the cash and government bonds decrease and the weights of corporate and securitized bonds increase. This again confirms that less liquid asset classes are sold last when a fund gets hit by a redemption shock. Lastly, the coefficients of the interaction between the flow and the flow sign for cash and government bonds are positive and significant. This indicates that in response to flows, fund managers change the weights of these two asset classes asymmetrically depending on whether flow is negative or positive.
In other words, fund managers sell cash and government bonds more aggressively when facing redemptions than buy those assets when they face inflows.
These results together show that bond fund managers follow the first asset (re)allocation strategy when facing redemptions. They sell more liquid assets such as cash and government bonds more relative to less liquid assets, such as securitized and corporate bonds. Therefore, fund managers mitigate the impact of redemptions and hence, tend not to destabilize the corporate bond market.
Security selection
In the previous section I show that facing redemptions, fund managers tend to sell corporate bonds less than other asset classes. Since the focus of this paper is on corporate bonds, in this section I want to study withing the corporate bond asset class, which assets are old more.
Similar to strategies in asset (re)allocation discussed in the previous section, fund managers may follow strategies in security selection when facing redemptions. They can sell more liquid corporate, less liquid ones or be neutral. These three strategies, again have different implications on the stability of the bond market.
To investigate which of these strategies are followed by fund managers, I study the impact of bond liquidity on the probability of bonds being sold. I use a comprehensive set of measures used in the literature as a proxy for bond liquidity. These measures include: Amihud illiquidity measure, number of trades, trading volume, time to maturity, issue size, bond age and credit rating. My empirical setting is as follows.
In each quarter, I pick funds in the bottom quartile of flows, distressed funds. Then I observe their holdings in the beginning and in the end of the quarter and identify the corporate bonds that are sold over the quarter and the ones that are not. Then I run a linear probability model regressions in which the dependent variable is one if a bond was sold and zero otherwise.
23
The independent variables are liquidity measures. Since I want to compare bonds in the same portfolio, I include fund-quarter fixed effects in the regressions as well. The results are reported in Table 6 .
{Insert Table 6} 23 I also ran Logit regressions and the results are qualitatively the same. I only show the LPM results because they are easier to interpret.
As we can see in Table ( 6), higher Amihud illiquidity, longer time to maturity, higher age and higher credit rating (lower credit quality), reduce the chance of selling a bond. However, number of trades, trading volume and issue size have a positive impact on the probability of selling a bond. These results show that within the corporate bond asset class, fund managers sell more liquid bonds. By doing so, they avoid large price impacts and hence, tend not to destabilize the corporate bond market. The left panel reports these figures for bond funds and the right panel for equity funds. As we can see in Table 7 , in each flow decile, the average flows for bond funds and equity funds are quite similar. Therefore in each row of the table, corresponding columns are comparable.
{Insert Table 7}   Table 7 presents interesting patterns helping us understand redemption management practices by bond funds and equity funds. As we expect for both equity and bond funds, the fraction of positions expanded monotonically increases as the flow level increases. This pattern is the opposite for the fraction of positions reduced and the fraction of positions eliminated. The 24 Hotchkiss and Jostova (2007) and Edwards et al. (2007) show that time to maturity, age and credit rating have an impact on the transaction costs. Therefore, I can also conclude that fund managers try to minimize transaction costs as well.
25 Note that the existing positions in the previous quarter is the base for calculating these figures. Therefore new position are reported in this table.
pattern for the fraction of positions maintained however, is u-shaped. Funds faced with high flows (inflow or outflow) tend to trade on many of their positions, while funds with low flow magnitudes tend to maintain many of their existing positions. Table 7 , is that facing similar flows, the fraction of positions maintained is by far larger for bond funds than equity funds. For example, bond funds in the lowest flow decile (with an average flow of -16.46% ) maintain 52.83% of their positions from the previous quarter. This figure for equity funds (with an average flow of -15.94%) is only 14.67%. This pattern confirms the results in Table 5 stating that bond funds first trade cash and government securities and then transact in the corporate bond market. However, looking at the portfolio composition of equity funds, we realize that equity funds hold a small amount of cash buffer, forcing them to sell equities to meet redemptions. This is consistent with the findings of Lou (2012) . As a result, equity funds destabilize stock prices while bond funds do not destabilize corporate bond prices.
Another interesting pattern in
Lastly, as we can see in Table 7 , the ratio of the positions reduced to the positions eliminated is significantly different for bond funds compared to equity funds. For instance, facing redemptions (in lower flow quartiles), bond funds prefer to completely eliminate a position fro their portfolio, while equity funds tend to just reduce the position. One explanation for this phenomenon might be transaction costs in the corporate bond market. Edwards et al. (2007) show trade size is a significant determinant of the corporate bonds transaction cost. Thus fund managers not willing to pay high transaction costs tend to increase the trade size as much as they can which leads to completely selling some of their holdings.
Robustness check
I run several robustness checks in this section to make sure my results are robust to changes in some arbitrary parameters and also to using different proxies for the variables of interest. In equations (1) and (2), I define distress funds as funds in the bottom quartile of flow in a given quarter. Therefore the threshold that separates distress funds from non-distress funds changes every quarter depending on the general pattern of flows. As a robustness check, I define a fixed threshold, -5%, and categorize funds according to this predetermined cutoff. I run regressions (3) and (4) using the new definition of distressed funds and the results (not reported) hold.
Moreover in section 4.2 and 4.3, H(I)-H(III) predict that the sensitivity of the flow correlation becomes asymmetrically stronger for the subsample of negative flows, as the bond market and fund holdings becomes less. Therefore, I run regressions (5)- (8) on both the full sample and the subsample of negative flows. The problem of running regressions on the subsample of negative flows is that this subsample is not chosen randomly, hence the estimates may be biased. I use Heckman (1979) selection model to solve this potential problem. Heckman selection model has two stages. In the first stage, using some independent variables I estimate the likelihood that a negative flow is observed in a given month. I use the sign of the lagged flows (up to 3 months) as well as the average return of the fund over the past 3 months to estimate the first stage.
In the second stage, I use the predicted individual probabilities as an additional explanatory variable to estimate the regressions (5)-(8). The results shown in Table 8 using the Heckman selection model, support H(I), H(II) and H(III).
Conclusion
The corporate bond market has grown significantly over the past several years. Meanwhile, corporate bond funds have increased their market share and become a major player in this important market. In contrast to the traditional players in the corporate bond market such as insurance companies and pension funds, corporate bond funds engage in liquidity transformation that is, issuing liquid claims while investing in relatively illiquid assets. The liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities make bond funds vulnerable to investor runs as well as asset fire sales, which may pose threats to corporate bond market stability.
In this paper, using an identification which is unique to the corporate bond market, I find that despite concerns, bond funds do not destabilize the corporate bond market. Even in extreme market conditions such as the recent financial crisis (2008) (2009) , the impact of sell-offs by bond funds on corporate bond prices is short-lived, small in magnitude and limited to the subsample of distressed funds. Given that the literature has found the opposite for equity funds and their impact on stock prices, my finding for bond funds is somewhat puzzling.
I find that differences in fund management can explain this puzzling finding. I show that bond funds hold a significant amount of cash and government securities as a buffer. Then I show that they actually use this buffer to absorb redemption shocks and therefore, do not have to significantly liquidate corporate bonds. Equity funds by contrast, hold only a small amount of cash. Hence to meet redemption requests, equity funds have to sell equities in large magnitudes which may destabilize stock prices.
Appendix A. Alternate explanations for correlated flows
There are two alternate explanations for correlated flows. The first explanation is investors' reaction to the same information but at different times and the second explanation is information content of flows. In this section I show that even though these explanations may be true, they are not sufficient to justify my hypotheses and the supporting results in Table 4 , Panel A and B.
A1. Investors' reaction to the same information
To examine the first explanation, let us assume new information comes out at time t, then some investors react to it at time t + 1, some react with a delay at time t + 2 and so on until t + K. Flow at time t + K can be separated into two components: the information component due to the new information released between t and t + K − 1 and a random component. We can think of the new information as fund specific information or any economic news that may trigger flows. The random component can be thought of as investors' idiosyncratic liquidity needs. I also assume that the random component is orthogonal to the fund specific or economic news. Moreover, both the new information and random liquidity needs are independent over time. Therefore I can decompose the flow to fund j at time t + K as:
where:
corr(I j,t , j,t+k ) = 0, f or k >= 0 corr( j,t+m , j,t+n ) = 0 f or m = n corr(I j,t+m , I j,t+n ) = 0 f or m = n α j,k is a constant which represents the fraction of investors who react to a new piece of information after k periods, ( K k=1 α j,k = 1). Without loss of generality, I assume that K = 2. It means that investors react to new information either after one period or after two periods.
After some simplifications, the correlation between two consecutive flows can be written as:
If I assume the variance of the random component for fund j does not change over time and the variance of new information does not change between t − 1 and t + 1, after some simplifications I have:
As we can see, the correlation between two consecutive flows is positively related to the ratio of the variance of new information over the variance of the random component. Table 4 , panel B. Note that according to Table 4 panel B, the flow correlation during the crisis increases by 47% for the full sample and 103% for the subsample of negative flows.
A2. Information content of flows
The second alternate explanation for correlated flows is the information content of flows.
According to this explanation, when a flow happens at time t+1, the flow itself reveals some new information about the fund fundamentals to the investors. Some investors use that information at time t + 2 to decide about the flow and this is the reason flows are correlated. Therefore, the higher the information content of the flow is, the higher is the correlation between consecutive flows.
To formally formulate the model, I again use a similar method as in the previous section.
Assume there are two types of investors. Type 1 investors are informed and can observe the new information at time t and react to it at time t + 1. Type 2 investors are not informed and cannot observe the new information, yet they can observe the flow in the previous period.
There is again a random component in the flow in each time period which is due to investors' idiosyncratic liquidity needs. Note that I assume uninformed investors can tell apart the uninformed component of the flow and the rest, which are the informed component and the random component. As a results, flow to fund j at time t + 2 can be written as:
In equation (16), α 1 and α 2 are the fraction of informed and uninformed investors, respectively.
g is a function that maps observed flows to the decision of uninformed investors in the current period. γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter indicating the information content of the previous flow. For example γ t+1 = 0 means that uninformed investors do not find the flow at t informative, hence show no reaction, and vice versa for γ t+1 = 1. As we can see in equation (16), flow correlation of fund j is positively related to γ t+1 , which means the higher the informativeness of flows, the higher the flow correlation.
Due to the higher uncertainty during the crisis, the informativeness of flows is expected to decrease. Therefore, according to the model, the flow correlation during the crisis should drop. This is exactly the opposite of H(I) and the results in Table 4 Table 3 This table shows the results of some tests on the following regression.
∆Y ield spread ijt = α + β 1 Sell -offExpo ijt + β 2 Sell -offExpo ijt * crisis + γ controls + µ jt + ijt
In the first test, funds in the bottom flow quartile are replaced with the funds in the second lowest flow quartile. In the second and the third tests, the crisis period is moved to Q3-2006 to Q4-2007 and Q3-2009 to Q4-2010, respectively . In the forth test, the dependent variable is the change in the yield spread between the beginning of the current quarter, t, and one quarter after the forced sale, t + 1. I run this test to see if the change in the yield spread during the crisis lasts beyond the current quarter. ∆Y ieldSpread t is the change (in basis points) in the bond yield spread over quarter t. ∆Y ieldSpread t+1 is the change (in basis points) in the bond yield spread over quarters t and t + 1. Sell -offExpo is the fraction of a corporate bond outstanding which is sold by distressed bond funds in quarter t. For the ease of interpretation, I normalize the variable by dividing them by their standard deviation. Distressed funds defined as funds in the bottom quartile of flow in each quarter. In the base specification crisis is a dummy which is equal to one between 2008-Q1 and 2009-Q2.
Issue size is in million dollars. T ime to maturity and Age are in years. All standard errors are clustered by quarter. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. f low j,t = β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low j,(t−1) * Amihud + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt f low j,t =β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low vol. j,(t−1) * Amihud + β 3 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1)
+ β 4 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1) * Amihud + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt
In the obove equations Amihud is the equal weighted average of Amihud illiquidity measure of individual bonds in each month. I use it as a proxy for the illiquidity of the bond market. Flow volatility is the standard deviation of fund flows over the past 12 months and I use it as a proxy for fund liquidity. Performance is the average fund returns over the past 3 months. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Full sample Subsample of negative flows f low j,t = β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low j,(t−1) * crisis + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt f low j,t =β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low vol. j,(t−1) * crisis + β 3 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1)
+ β 4 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1) * crisis + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt
In the above equations crisis is a dummy which is equal to one for 2008-Q1 to 2009-Q2. I use it as a proxy for the illiquidity of the bond market. Flow volatility is the standard deviation of fund flows over the past 12 months and I use it as a proxy for fund liquidity. Performance is the average fund returns over the past 3 months. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Full sample Subsample of negative flows Table 5 This table shows how fund managers reallocate capital over different asset classes when facing flows. Among six asset classes that bond funds invest in I only study four of them, cash and cash equivalents, government securities, securitized bonds and corporate bonds. I run the following regression for each class separately to investigate how different asset class weights change in response to fund flows.
ω ijt = α + β 1 ω ij(t−1) + β 2 (return ijt − return it ) + β 3 f it + γ 4 f low sign it + γ 5 f low it * f low sign it + η i + τ t + ijt I get quarterly asset class weights from Morningstar. Flow and return data come from CRSP mutual fund database. I calculate fund specific asset class returns, return ijt , using asset class indices from Bloomberg, adjusted to the holding characteristics of each fund i.e. maturity and credit quality. Flow sign is equal to one when flow is negative and zero otherwise. Since I have the lagged dependent variable and fund fixed effect in the regression, I also estimate this regression using Arellano and Bond (1991) method for dynamic panel data. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Pooled OLS Dynamic Panel Data
Log(%Cash) Log(%Government) Log(%Securitized) Log(%Corporate) Log(%Cash) Log(%Government) Log(%Securitized) Log(%Corporate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Table 6 This table shows security selection by the managers of distressed funds. Funds in the bottom quartile of flow in each quarter are considered distressed funds. I run a linear probability model in which the dependent variable is one if a bond is sold and zero if it is maintained in the portfolio. Note that higher credit rating means lower credit quality. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Table 7 This Table 8 As a robustness check, I run the regression (5)-(8) on the subsample of negative flows using the Heckman correction model. I use the sign of lagged flows (up to 3 months) as well as the fund performance over the past 3 months, in the first stage to estimate the likelihood of a flow being negative. Then I use the predicted individual probabilities as an additional explanatory variable in the second stage to estimate the coefficients of interest. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
f low j,t = β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low j,(t−1) * Amihud + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt f low j,t = β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low j,(t−1) * crisis + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt f low j,t =β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low vol. j,(t−1) * Amihud + β 3 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1)
+ β 4 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1) * Amihud + γ controls + η j + τ t + jt f low j,t =β 1 f low j,(t−1) + β 2 f low vol. j,(t−1) * crisis + β 3 f low j,(t−1) * f low vol. j,(t−1)
Subsample of negative flows 
